INTRODUCTION
The state ought not to help those who can better help themselves. That precept, though fundamental to philosophical justifications of liberal constitutional republics, 1 does not get much play in the judicial deliberations of those same republics' courts. Courts in the United States, for instance, generally regard state action as prima facie justified, curbing such state action only if it evinces irrationality 2 or an arbitrary and † Associate Professor, Chapman University School of Law. REV. 611, 645 (1988) ("Whether based on rights theories (Dworkin) or economic theories (Calabresi and Ackerman), liberals often preserve the free market system as the core image and justify governmental regulation of the market by reference to the concept of 'market failure' or to cases where 'unequal bargaining power' vitiates consent." (footnotes omitted)); see also infra notes 175-83 (cataloging a wide range of liberal political views that favor private action but justify state action as necessary to achieve what private action cannot).
2. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 591-94 (1979) (upholding the public agency's refusal to employ persons receiving methadone treatment as rational).
deliberations only implicitly, it has lately come to play an open and explicit role in determining the constitutionality of speech restrictions. U.S. courts have thus made clear that when it comes to restricting speech based on its content, state agents must not try to do for us what we can do reasonably well for ourselves. 8 Under the guise of strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to require that state actors imposing a content-based restriction on speech prove that the restriction (1) advances a compelling government interest, and (2) is narrowly tailored to achieve that end. 9 The Court includes under the latter prong an inquiry into whether the state action in question offers the least restrictive means of achieving the state's allegedly compelling interest. 10 show that the Government's ends [in restricting speech based on its content] are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.").
10. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 ("If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative."); Reno II, 521 U.S. at 874 ("[The] burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.").
Often, under the "narrowly tailored" prong of strict scrutiny, the Court does no more than inquire into the availability of less restrictive means. The Court is vague, however. See, e.g., Reno II, 521 U.S. at 870-79 (citing vagueness, overbreadth, and availability of less restrictive means as evidence that the statute was not narrowly tailored); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 351-53 (1995) (citing overbreadth and availability of less restrictive means as evidence that the statute was not narrowly tailored); see also Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1487, 1532 (1995) ("Although the Court tends to use terms like 'narrowly tailored' and 'least restrictive means' indiscriminately, . . . First Amendment scrutiny is comprised of two distinct elements. First, the regulation must . . . not be overinclusive or overbroad. Additionally, it must impose no greater infringement upon the affected speech than is necessary." (footnotes omitted)); Marc E. Isserles aspects of strict scrutiny-the "compelling interest" prong and the "least restrictive means" inquiry-have provided two openings for courts to consider self-help alternatives to state action. Traditionally, and as detailed in Part I, courts tend to cite the ready availability of self-help remedies as evidence that state agents lack any compelling interest to restrict speech. 11 Perhaps because the self-help remedies before them have taken such simple and direct forms-looking away, for instancethose courts have not trumpeted the fact that they have employed self-help to limit state action. 12 Rather, such courts seem to regard such self-help as a plain fact about the world, an effective remedy always ready at hand, that obviously renders state action superfluous. 13 The advent of technologies capable of filtering offensive speech, however, has recently encouraged courts to see selfhelp in a different light.
As Part II describes, courts increasingly cite such technological self-help as evidence that state agents have sought unjustifiably restrictive means of achieving their ends. 14 The Supreme Court, for instance, recently confirmed its willingness to compare the restrictiveness of the state's remedy for the supposed ills of free speech with the restrictiveness of alternative, self-help remedies. 15 The Supreme Court, moreover, has embraced selfhelp's new role with evident consciousness that it has opened the door to radically revising the proper limits of state action: "Technology expands the capacity to choose; and it denies the potential of this revolution if we assume the Government is best positioned to make these choices for us." 16 constitutional defect."); Volokh, Permissible Tailoring, supra note 7, at 2421-22 (finding four sub-tests within the "narrowly tailored" test: advancement of the interest, overinclusivness, least restrictive means, and underinclusiveness).
Readers who prefer other taxonomies of First Amendment law should bear in mind, however, that the one adopted here has no substantive effect on the Article's analysis.
11. See discussion infra Part I. 12. See discussion infra Part I. Notwithstanding these contrasts between the two ways in which courts invoke self-help in strict scrutiny jurisprudence, the same fundamental principle applies in all such cases: Courts rightly endeavor to alleviate the social costs of free speech by the most efficient means possible. The phenomenon initially may seem puzzling; the Court's pursuit of efficiency appears to transcend the doctrinal distinction between the strict scrutiny "compelling interest" and "least restrictive means" inquiries. That distinction might prove more sharp if courts read the First Amendment's plea for "no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech" 17 to categorically exclude a great many speech restrictions from any plausible claim to constitutionality. 18 Instead None of this analysis signifies that "compelling interest" equals "least restrictive means" equals "wealth maximization." Those different inquiries continue to apply to different questions and to yield different answers thereto. It does demonstrate how common threads appear when we view strict scrutiny through the lens of self-help, however. 35 That observation alone makes the present effort worthwhile from a pedagogical point of view.
As discussed in Part III, moreover, delineating self-help's role under strict scrutiny also serves to illustrate a fundamental principle of liberal jurisprudence: Political entities should undertake only those projects that they can accomplish 27 39. Not all else is equal, of course, in a case where one offended by speech can assert a right to avoid it, such as a property right, independent of the rights defined by the First Amendment. A staunch proponent of law and economics analysis might well argue that efficiency, properly understood, encompasses the costs of violating such independent rights. The present discussion need not vet that methodological claim, however; it suffices to observe that such cases should be disposed of on the grounds that a party who can avoid offensive speech by the exercise of an independent right has an obligation under strict scrutiny's "least restrictive means" test to do so. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (finding unconstitutional a city ordinance barring door-to-door distributors of publications from summoning residents to receive the publications on grounds that "[t]he dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors").
Nor is all else equal when speech intrudes into the privacy of one's home. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85, 488 (1988) (finding constitutional an ordinance banning picketing before or about a residence on grounds that the state has a significant interest in protecting residential privacy). It hardly takes a law and economics zealot, however, to conclude that a cost-benefit analysis can accommodate the salient difference between encountering offensive speech in public and having it burst into one's living room.
burden of proof on those who would use it to impose contentbased restrictions on speech. 40 It should thus cause no surprise that courts have found state action restricting speech based on its content unconstitutional in cases where they have found self-help capable of generating the same benefits. Granted, it may seem a bit surprising that academic commentators have almost entirely overlooked this aspect of First Amendment law. 41 The courts that have ensconced self-help in the "compelling interest" prong of the strict scrutiny test have not done so very self-consciously or explicitly. They appear, rather, to have had more concern for applying common sense to the problems at hand than for developing jurisprudential signposts for future courts.
Ritualistic invocation of the captive audience doctrine also bears some blame for having obscured from courts and commentators the more fundamental role that self-help plays in strict scrutiny's compelling interest prong. As section A describes, the way that courts have applied the term 43 strongly suggests that an audience qualifies as "captive" only if it lacks attractive self-help remedies for countering offensive speech. 44 As section B observes, moreover, even outside the scope of the captive audience doctrine, the ready availability of a self-help remedy can deprive the state of any compelling interest for restricting speech. 45 Reference to selfhelp thus both helps to explain the captive audience doctrine and accounts for other aspects of strict scrutiny's compelling interest prong. As a general matter, cases in the former line tend to concern forms of self-help so immediate and instinctual-averting one's gaze, for instance-as to seem a fact of biology, whereas cases in the latter line tend to concern forms of self-help so customary and commendable-raising one's children, for instance-as to seem a fact of morality. It remains for us to sift through the precedents and draw out the 44. Occasional extreme statements attributing utter helplessness to a captive audience, see, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (characterizing bus commuters as a captive audience "incapable of declining to receive" message), should not obscure the fact that courts impliedly assess self-help alternatives in their determinations of captivity. Even bus commuters can, for instance, close their eyes and stuff wax in their ears. Courts evidently recognize, however, that such self-help would come at too high a cost.
45. See infra Part I.B.
exact role that self-help has played in determining when a compelling interest justifies a content-based restriction on speech.
A. SELF-HELP AND CAPTIVE AUDIENCES
Cohen v. California 46 apparently represents the earliestand certainly represents the most notorious-of the Supreme Court cases finding that the ready availability of self-help remedies disproves the state's claim to have a compelling interest in content-based restrictions on speech. 47 The Cohen Court reversed as unconstitutional a conviction based on the public display of a jacket emblazoned with "Fuck the Draft," reasoning that parties offended by the sentiment "could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." 48 Ready access to that form of self-help meant that the audience did not qualify as captive, which in turn denied the state its last and best claim to have a compelling interest in restricting the offensive speech. 49 The Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in Spence v. Washington 50 to reverse the conviction, under a flag misuse statute, of a protestor who had attached a peace sign to his U.S. flag and had flown it on private property but in public view. The state lacked any compelling interest to forbid the display, reasoned the Court, because "[a]nyone who might have been offended could easily have avoided the display." 51 Cohen also evidently inspired the holding of Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 52 where the Court struck down as unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting indecent drive-in movies. The Erznoznik Court paraphrased Cohen to set forth a more general rule: Absent two narrow exceptions-when the target of speech expressly asks to not receive it at home or when an audience's captivity makes it impractical for them to avoid unwanted speech-"the burden normally falls upon the Conversely, Supreme Court opinions suggest that a captive audience does exist when no self-help remedy would suffice to mitigate the impact of offensive speech. When, for instance, the Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights 54 upheld the constitutionality of a municipality's ban on political advertisements in its public transport buses, Justice Douglas concurred on grounds that the city's content-based restriction on speech protected the sensibilities of "people who because of necessity become commuters and at the same time captive viewers or listeners." 55 By contrast, four justices dissented in Lehman on grounds that commuters confronted with the print ads in question could simply avert their eyes. 56 "This is not a case where an unwilling or unsuspecting rapid transit rider is powerless to avoid messages he deems unsettling," they argued. 57 Self-help thus resolved the case; the Lehman Justices' varying evaluations of the effectiveness of self-help determined whether they thought the state had a compelling interest in protecting an allegedly captive audience from offensive speech. Similar concerns played a role in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 58 where the Court found restrictions on indecent broadcasts constitutional on grounds, in part, that "prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content." 59 In its most recent analysis of the role that self-help plays in strict scrutiny ' [e] to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors." Martin, 319 U.S. at 147. The Martin Court's subsequent discussion of appropriate "legal methods" demonstrates that it did not exclude, and suggests that it meant to include, self-help remedies. See, e.g., id. at 147-48 (discussing the role warnings play in combating trespass); id. at 148 (encouraging municipalities to leave "the decision as to whether distributors of literature may lawfully call at a home where it belongs-with the homeowner himself"); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949) (interpreting Martin to have been based "on the ground that the home owner could protect himself from such intrusion by an appropriate sign 'that he is unwilling to be disturbed'" (quoting Martin, 319 U.S. at 148)).
65. Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 542 n.11 (1980) ("Even if there were a compelling state interest in protecting consumers against overly intrusive bill inserts, it is possible that the State could achieve its goal simply by requiring Consolidated Edison to stop sending bill inserts to the homes of objecting customers."). The Consolidated Edison majority did not speak to the apparent contradiction. Justice Stevens distinguished the cases, however, on grounds that the speech at issue in Consolidated Edison risked at worst presenting offensive ideas, whereas the speech at issue in Pacifica took an ugly form. Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 547-48 (Stevens, J., concurring). His distinction makes sense from a self-help point of view because quick action-such as "transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket," id. at 542-can largely obviate the impact of offensive ideas in print form whereas even "prior warnings cannot completely protect" audiences from the offense rendered by indecent words. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. Other distinguishing factors include the Pacifica Court's concern for protecting children from indecent broadcasting, id. at 749-50, and its admonition that "each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems. And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection." Id. at 748 (citations omitted).
Of course, these considerations go only to whether the state has demonstrated that it has a compelling interest in restricting speech. They do not resolve whether the state has narrowly tailored its censorship. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) ("[E]ven where speech is indecent and enters the home, the objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative.").
self-help: "Where a single speaker communicates to many listeners, the First Amendment does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the 'captive' audience cannot avoid objectionable speech." 68 The Supreme Court's judgments on whether the state has a compelling interest in content-based censorship thus effectively hold that an audience qualifies as captive only if members of that audience lack adequate self-help remedies to offensive speech. 69 Lower courts have applied this principle in a variety of circumstances, interpreting and extending it in the process. They have followed the Supreme Court in substance by defining as "non-captive" those audiences that enjoy adequate self-help remedies. They have also mirrored the Supreme Court in form, by "announcing" their use of self-help only implicitly-by dint of the effect of their rulings-rather than by express statement.
In 71 the Seventh Circuit found unconstitutional on similar grounds a municipal ordinance barring Nazis from assembling and speaking. The court explained, "There need be no captive audience, as Village residents may, if they wish, simply avoid the" offensive demonstrations. 72 Trial courts have, in striking down content-based restrictions on print advertisements in public transit systems, shown remarkable sensitivity to the various factors that can render self-help more or less efficacious. Applying strict scrutiny to a ban on distasteful ads in public areas of a subway 77. Id. Although it affirmed the trial court opinion, the court of appeals evinced confusion about the role played by the captive audience doctrine in the proceedings below. The circuit court claimed that the CTA did not "attempt to show that its rejection of PPA's message is 'necessary to serve a compelling state interest,'" Planned Parenthood, 767 F.2d at 1233 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)), yet the court went on to observe that the "CTA in its reply brief argues that its rejection of PPA's message is justified by its desire to protect the captive audience of bus and train riders." Id. at 1233 n.11. The circuit court thus seemed unaware that the captive audience doctrine serves to determine whether the state has a compelling interest in restricting speech based on its content. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
78. Planned Parenthood, 592 F. Supp. at 555 n.18 (citation omitted); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 725, 748-49 (1978) ("To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language demonstrate, even when strict scrutiny's traditional legal jargon obscures the operative doctrine, courts in practice determine whether an audience qualifies as captive by carefully calculating whether its members enjoy access to adequate selfhelp remedies.
B. SELF-HELP AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Even outside the scope of the captive audience doctrine, the ready availability of self-help remedies can show that the state has no compelling interest in restricting speech. In contrast to the ample case law demonstrating self-help's role in defining captive audiences, granted, only very recent and relatively scant case law indicates self-help's more general role in strict scrutiny's compelling interest prong. Each type of appeal to self-help complies with the same principle, however: The state cannot bear the heavy burden of proving that is has a compelling interest in a content-based restriction on speech when, in counterbalance, a court finds some form of self-help adequate to mitigate the harms in question. As illustrated in the preceding section, courts engaged in captive audience inquiries express that principle by invoking immediate, physical, and even instinctual forms of self-help. 79 This section illustrates how courts invoke self-help when scrutinizing more generally whether the state has a compelling interest in its content-based speech restrictions, albeit self-help arising less from reflex than from customary social practices.
The Supreme Court demonstrated in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 80 how the self-help that parents enjoy by merit of their traditional authority over their children can serve to disprove a state claim to a compelling interest in restricting speech. 81 The Court relied heavily on a "least restrictive means" analysis, finding unconstitutional a ban on indecent cable programming during prime time viewing hours because the state might have required only that cable companies block signals to and at the request of individual households. 82 The Court argued in the alternative, however, is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.").
79. In finding unconstitutional a criminal prosecution based on the playing of "gangster rap" at a skating venue frequented by minors, the Torries court held that no compelling interest justified such a content-based restriction on speech. 89 Distinguishing precedents that had found such an interest in the regulation of broadcast speech, the Torries court observed that parents have absolute control over whether or not to allow their children to attend the Skate Zone on Saturday nights. Parental household basis presented an effective, less restrictive alternative to [ Like Playboy, then, Torries stands for the proposition that parents' authority over their children can serve as a form of self-help sufficiently effective to invalidate the state's claim to have a compelling interest in protecting minors from harmful speech. 91 Playboy arguably represents not merely an expansion of self-help's role in strict scrutiny's "compelling interest" prong, but also a limitation on prior authority. Extant law had suggested that the state might have a compelling interest in shielding a child from indecent speech regardless of the moral authority and effective control of that child's parents. 92 "The State . . . has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth," 93 the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York had summarily claimed, even while admitting that the statute in question left parents in control of their children's access to indecent material. 94 The Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT III) litigation generated more careful consideration of the State's allegedly independent interest. 95 After confirming the undisputed proposition that "the Government has a compelling interest in supporting parental supervision of what children see and hear on the public airwaves," the ACT III majority added, "[W]e believe the Government's own interest in the well-being of minors provides an independent 90. Id. 91. Given that the Torries court did not explicitly say it was invoking parents' self-help to counter a compelling interest claim, two interpretive proofs of that reading bear note: the context of the court's discussion of parents' self-help, amidst references to captive audience cases that concerned compelling interest claims, see supra Part I.A, and the court's separate disposition of the "least restrictive means" question, see 111 F. Supp. 2d at 822 ("Rather than choosing the least restrictive means to control the alleged violence at the Skate Zone, defendants have thrown the broadest net possible.").
92. 
II. SELF-HELP VERSUS THE RESTRICTIVENESS OF THE STATE'S MEANS
In contrast to the role it played from the very birth of strict scrutiny's "compelling interest" prong, 102 only quite recently has self-help begun to influence deliberations over whether speech restrictions qualify, under strict scrutiny's other prong, as "narrowly tailored." Self-help has won this newfound influence by virtue of its capacity to illustrate that state action does not represent the least restrictive means of achieving the state's compelling interest. Furthermore, while in compelling interest inquiries self-help appears as a basic fact of the 96. Id. at 661. 97. Id. at 678 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) ("In asserting both interestsfacilitating parental supervision and protecting children from indecent broadcast-the Government must assume not only that parents agree with the Commission, but that parents supervise their children in some uniform manner. Surely, this is not the case.").
98. Id. at 682 ("Where the interest of protecting children conflicts with parental preferences, and where this interest is asserted with no evidence of harm, it cannot withstand exacting scrutiny."); see also id. at 686 (Wald, J., dissenting) ("Although the Supreme Court has recognized the government's own interest in protecting children from exposure to indecency, it has never identified this interest as one that could supersede the parental interest.").
99. observing that "there are many less intrusive, more effective ways to screen harmful material to minors. Some of the ways or methods that this can be accomplished is through the use of currently marketed software that restrict content received." 127 In contrast to other courts that have weighed self-help remedies in strict scrutiny analyses, however, the Cyberspace Communications court also cited distinctly low-tech tools:
Parental control is the most effective method in overseeing where the child ventures. This can be as simple as placing the computer in a common area of your home, like the living room, so the child can anticipate the presence of an adult. . . . A parent could also place a lock on the computer until such time as a parent can supervise the child. If the parent cannot directly supervise the child's computer usage, then set limits, much like what shows a child can and cannot watch on television. 128 The court had little sympathy for irresponsible parents, noting somewhat contemptuously that "every computer is equipped with an on/off switch." 129 The Engler court's invocation of personal-or rather parental-responsibility echoes courts that have invoked personal responsibility under strict scrutiny's compelling interest prong. 130 Here, though, the court regarded both technical and moral forms of self-help as evidence that the state had unnecessarily restricted speech:
Although it is difficult in today's society to constantly monitor the activities of children, it is still the right, and duty, of every parent to teach and mold children's concepts of good and bad, right and wrong. This right is no greater than in the confines of ones [sic] own home. A family with values will supervise their children. This includes setting limits, and either being there to enforce those limits, or utilizing the available technology to do so. With such less restrictive means to monitor the online activities of children, the government need not 
2003] FREE SPEECH AND SELF-HELP 767
restrict the right of free speech guaranteed to adults.
131
One might not expect such free-form sermonizing to survive appellate review. As it turns out, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. 132 On remand, the trial court issued a permanent injunction, 133 both taking the opportunity to repeat its observation that concerned parents could avail themselves of less restrictive self-help remedies 134 and taking another jab at parents who shirk their responsibilities on that count. 135 Reno II has generated a rapidly-growing line of cases willing to grant private self-help the power to render overly restrictive state action unconstitutional. The Third Circuit's refusal to give self-help similar respect in ACLU v. Reno (Reno IV) 136 represents a notable exception to that trend. In that case, which concerned the constitutionality of a federal statute restricting harmful-to-minors Internet speech, 137 the Third Circuit grappled with the legal significance of "actions taken by a minor's parent to supervise or block harmful material by using filtering software." 138 From the unobjectionable observation that "such actions do not constitute government action," the court leapt to the conclusion: "[W]e do not consider this to be a lesser restrictive means for the government to achieve its compelling interest." 139 The court felt compelled, moreover, to repeat the point:
Although much attention at the District Court level was focused on the availability, virtues and effectiveness of voluntary blocking or filtering software that can enable parents to limit the harmful material to which their children may otherwise be exposed, the parental hand should not be looked to as a substitute for a 
140
That undoubtedly qualifies as dicta, because the Third Circuit resolved Reno IV solely on grounds that reliance on a national community standard rendered the statute in question, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 141 facially unconstitutional. 142 Still, it qualifies as controversial dicta. The court offered neither argument nor supporting authority for its claim that self-help should have no bearing on inquiries made under strict scrutiny's "least restrictive means" prong. Nor did the court evince any awareness that its novel theory conflicted with the Supreme Court's holding in Reno II. In defense of the Third Circuit, it bears repeating that Reno II appears to offer the first instance of a court including self-help remedies in a "least restrictive means" inquiry and that the Reno II court did not clearly explain what it had done on that count. 143 Incredibly, though, the Third Circuit had the chutzpa to cap its disparaging comments about the probative value of self-help with a "but see" cite 144 to Playboy, where the Supreme Court had given unmistakable support to the contrary view! 145
The Third Circuit's disposition of Reno IV failed to survive Supreme Court review. 146 The Court, however, granted certiorari only on the narrow question of whether COPA's reliance on "community standards" facially violated the First Amendment, 147 and the Court's plurality opinion did not specifically address the court of appeals' claim that "least restrictive means" inquiries must take no account of self-help 147. See id. at 1703 ("This case presents the narrow question whether the Child Online Protection Act's (COPA) use of' 'community standards' to identify 'material that is harmful to minors' violates the First Amendment. We hold that this aspect of COPA does not render the statute facially unconstitutional.").
remedies. Fortunately for the court of appeals-and for free speech-the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Third Circuit will thus have ample opportunity to rectify its crabbed perception of strict scrutiny. So rectify it should; as Part III explains, the Third Circuit erred grievously in claiming that self-help has no role to play in strict scrutiny's least restrictive means test.
III. UPGRADING FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
Self-help's influence on free speech strict scrutiny jurisprudence offers a signal example of how changing facts can shape interpretation of the Constitution's unchanging words. That relationship springs forth with particular clarity in the recent and explicit judicial acknowledgement 148 that advances in self-help's effectiveness can reduce the scope of state action permitted under strict scrutiny's "least restrictive means" test. The Supreme Court has not merely recognized the potentially revolutionary impact of pegging free speech jurisprudence to technological advances; it has embraced it:
The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments . . . can be formed, tested, and expressed. What the Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority. Technology expands the capacity to choose; and it denies the potential of this revolution if we assume the Government is best positioned to make these choices for us. 149 How can we understand and justify that remarkable approach 150 to free speech jurisprudence?
Consider an analogy between computer software and constitutional law: 151 from advances in computer hardware, so too, the application of strict scrutiny benefits from advances in the technology of selfhelp. As its use of "benefit" hints, this analogy relies on normative judgments. We justify upgrading software to accommodate advances in hardware on grounds that we thereby make our software quicker, more powerful, and more functional-in short, better at doing what we want software to do.
Similarly, we can justify upgrading free speech jurisprudence to accommodate advances in self-help technology on grounds that we thereby make strict scrutiny better at doing what we want it to do: Detect and prohibit any content-based state censorship that is not absolutely necessary.
As the software analogy suggests, one might counter that upgrading free speech jurisprudence in step with advances in self-help imposes costs and uncertainty on the legal process. It takes time, effort, and sometimes considerable cash to upgrade software, after all, and to reap its benefits we often must also abandon old and comfortable habits for new ones. Similarly, as Stuart Benjamin has observed, courts struggle to keep up with the change that racing technology wreaks on legally relevant facts and, in so doing, those courts risk undermining their own precedents. 152 Perhaps courts could avoid upgrading their free speech jurisprudence if they enforced the plain meaning of the First Amendment and permitted "no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech"; 153 perhaps not. 154 At any rate, by embracing strict scrutiny the Supreme Court has rejected that straight-forward interpretative strategy for one that must take account of a great many legally significant facts. On this point, their functional equivalence, whereas I analogize software to jurisprudence in order to stress that both benefit from accommodating technological advances. In contrast to Lessig's analogy, furthermore, the present one goes toward showing an important distinction between private and state action: When the former advances, the latter should retreat. 153. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Volokh, Permissible Tailoring, supra note 7, at 2456 (arguing for an interpretation of the First Amendment under which "the Court should see its task as being the development of a system of categorical rules and categorical exceptions").
154. Benjamin observes that even self-proclaimed free speech absolutists find it difficult to dodge all factual inquiries and concludes, "The state of the world is indispensable to most judicial inquiries that one can imagine." Benjamin, supra note 152, at 274. then, the analogy between software and jurisprudence perhaps breaks down.
For while we have the right, however unattractive, to shrink away from technological progress, courts applying strict scrutiny have a duty to protect free speech in the real and present world. 155 That duty to update strict scrutiny jurisprudence applies especially with regard to advances in self-help. Consider the alternative approach, embodied by the Third Circuit's opinion in Reno IV, under which self-help "should not be looked to as a substitute for a congressional mandate." 156 That approach can only presume that Congress has a mandate to restrict speech regardless of whether citizens actually need such restrictions. Suppose, for instance, that a brilliant and civic-minded programmer has created and distributed free of charge software that, grace of artificial intelligence and natural language processing, effectively functions like an omniscient virtual nanny. Suppose the hypothetical software can, after conversing with a child's guardians, understand and enforce the subtle ethical guidelines they would have guide their child's access to Internet speech; the product responds perfectly to consumer preference.
Suppose, in short, that advancing technology has created a perfect self-help remedy to the problem of harmful-to-minors Internet speech.
The Reno IV court apparently would not care. It would decline to consider the ready availability of that ideal private solution when applying the "least restrictive means" test to a statute banning harmful-to-minors Internet speech. The court would decline to take notice even if, thanks to universal use of such an effective self-help technology, no child risked exposure to harmful Internet speech. The court would instead limit 155. During oral argument in Reno II, Justice Scalia commented, "This is an area where change is enormously rapid. Is it possible that this statute is unconstitutional today, or was unconstitutional 2 years ago when it was examined on the basis of a record done about 2 years ago, but will be constitutional next week?" Soon thereafter, he concluded that the statute's constitutionality "depends on the-on the security of the safe harbor. And how secure the safe harbor is depends so much upon technology. If neither that reductio ad absurdum nor the contrary Supreme Court precedent discussed above 157 suffice to cast doubt on the wisdom of the Reno IV court's disregard for selfhelp's role in the "least restrictive means" inquiry, consider two more points against it. First, given the parallel role that selfhelp has played in strict scrutiny's "compelling state interest" inquiry, 158 it is hard to see why a court following Reno IV would think it relevant that noncaptive audiences can avert their eyes from offensive speech. Such an aversion constitutes merely another form of self-help, after all. Consistency would thus appear to require a court adopting Reno IV's disregard for selfhelp to uphold the speech restrictions found unconstitutional in such Supreme Court opinions as Cohen v. California, 159 Spence v. Washington, 160 and Erznoznik v. Jacksonville. 161 Second, unless the Reno IV court were to take the untenable position that technological advances could never have any bearing on strict scrutiny inquiries, 162 it would have effectively created a one-way ratchet for increasing state power at the expense of free speech. Advances in technology would, after all, remain capable of turning formerly unconstitutional speech restrictions into newly constitutional ones. Indeed, the Reno IV court eagerly anticipated that outcome, saying, "We . . . express our confidence and firm conviction that developing technology will soon render the 'community standards' challenge moot, thereby making congressional regulation to protect minors from harmful material on the Web constitutionally practicable." 163 The disregard for self-help embodied in the Reno IV court's approach to strict scrutiny would thus assure that technological advances increase lawmakers' power to restrict speech without likewise empowering citizens to escape state censorship.
In the final analysis, the Reno IV court's refusal to consider self-help "as a substitute for a congressional mandate" 164 put matters exactly backwards. Lawmakers can have no mandate to violate the Constitution. As wiser courts have demonstrated in their invocations of strict scrutiny, 165 the availability of selfhelp remedies must play a crucial role in determining whether lawmakers violate the First Amendment when they restrict speech based on its content. The extent to which free speech jurisprudence favors private action over state action appears not only in how courts bring self-help to bear under strict scrutiny's "compelling interest" and "least restrictive means" inquiries, but also, and more pointedly, in how courts put on proponents of state action the burden of proving self-help inadequate. 166 In contrast, courts ask for no more than a plausible accounting of self-help's effectiveness and readily excuse its burdens and inevitable imperfections. 167 Far from an anomaly of strict scrutiny, that marked preference for private over state action appears throughout First Amendment jurisprudence. 168 It surfaces, for example, in the "not substantially broader than necessary" 169 test applied to content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions on speech; 164. Id. at 181 n.24. 165. See supra Parts I, II (reviewing relevant case law). 166. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) ("When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a contentbased speech restriction, it is the Government's obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals."); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (holding that, under strict scrutiny, "the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling, and the burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest" (footnote and citations omitted)). But see People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that there is no "blanket requirement that alternative means must first be tested before restrictions can be placed on protected speech to prevent specific conduct impermissible under any circumstances").
167. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 824 ("It is no response that voluntary blocking requires a consumer to take action, or may be inconvenient, or may not go perfectly every time. A court should not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative would be ineffective; and a court should not presume parents, given full information, will fail to act.").
168. Figuring this a plausible defense of that claim would so far exceed the bounds of the present paper as to require a wholly separate one, I plan an Article tentatively titled, Free Speech, Self-Help, and Constitutional Upgrades (rough draft on file with the author).
169 ' ] mutual security and protection against foreign enemies; for with no other object should it impose restrictions on freedom"); id. at 43 (positing the provision of such security "the only thing which the individual cannot obtain for himself and by his own unaided efforts" (footnote omitted)).
179. The legitimate object of government, is to do for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, but can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves-in their separate, and individual capacities.
In all that the people can individually do as well for themselves, government ought not to interfere. 182 That fundamental liberal principle may well soundindeed, should sound-uncontroversial. It should appeal to anyone who regards human welfare as the only proper end of the state, for the principle follows directly from the commonsense notion that we should not squander social wealth in assigning to political entities tasks that private entities can handle more efficiently. One would have to put the well-being of the state before the well-being of the people 183 to want otherwise.
It remains a question of fact whether political means can solve any particular social problem, such as indecent or restrictions on conduct without a sufficient reason . . . .").
181. See, e.g., 3 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 41 (1979) ("[I]n an advanced society government ought to use its power of raising funds by taxation to provide a number of services which for various reasons cannot be provided, or cannot be provided adequately, by the market."); id. at 43 (describing government agencies as "a purely utilitarian device, quite as useful as the butcher and the baker but no more so-and somewhat more suspect, because of the powers of compulsion which they can employ to cover their costs"); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND The defeat of Fascism, at least in its original guise, does not mean there remain no proponents of similarly illiberal views. As Richard A. Epstein observes, contemporary communitarians likewise complain that individual rights interfere with the collective's well-being. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 320 (1995) ("One does not have to impute terrible motives to modern theories to sound at least a note of caution about arguments that have traveled in such dubious company.").
harmful-to-minors Internet speech, more efficiently than private means can. Different sorts of liberals favor quite different answers to those questions, of course, but we need not rehash their debates here. It suffices for present purposes to observe that courts rightly engage in a similar factual inquiry when, as part of strict scrutiny, they compare the efficacy of state action with that of alternative, self-help remedies. The jurisprudence of a constitutional liberal republic, like the philosophy of liberalism generally, properly regards state action as, at best, a necessary evil designed to fix a salient and grave failure of civil society.
To put the matter in computational terms, state action represents a kludge. 184 We abandon kludges when presented with new and better programming solutions. So too should our courts upgrade constitutional jurisprudence by abandoning state action that advances in self-help render obsolete.
CONCLUSION
This Article reviewed the extant case law to reveal that self-help plays an under appreciated, but increasingly influential, role in free speech jurisprudence. From the very advent of the "compelling interest" test that courts apply to content-based speech restrictions, jurists have in practicealbeit only implicitly-cited the availability of simple and direct forms of self-help as grounds for finding state action unconstitutional. In the last few years, with the rise of tools empowering individuals and families to filter electronic information, courts applying strict scrutiny's "least restrictive means" test have begun to openly-and disfavorably-compare state action to alternative self-help remedies. These jurisprudential phenomena, the first somewhat covert and the second very recent, had hitherto escaped critical commentary. Analyzing self-help's role under strict scrutiny thus casts new light on First Amendment law, both clarifying old doctrines and preparing us to understand their application to new technologies.
Analyzing self-help's role in strict scrutiny cases also demonstrates that courts quite rightly invoke it when 184. "In information technology, a kludge (pronounced KLOOdzh) is an awkward or clumsy (but at least temporarily effective) solution to a programming or hardware design or implementation problem." WHATIS.COM, at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci212446,00.html (last updated Oct. 1, 1999). MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:743 evaluating the constitutionality of state action restricting speech. Even apart from the authority of controlling precedents, it is hard to imagine how courts could justify ignoring superior private alternatives to state action. Spelling out the consequences of the single holding to the contrary, that of the Reno IV court, provides a reductio ab adsurdum against ignoring self-help. Surveying the rest of First Amendment law and the fundamentals of political liberalism, moreover, illustrates that self-help's role in strict scrutiny comports with the general principle that we should resort to political means only when private ones fail.
Advances in self-help give courts a welcome opportunity to upgrade First Amendment strict scrutiny jurisprudence. Admittedly, each time that courts thus limit state action, they impose on each of us the responsibility for adopting the new and improved self-help technologies that render such state action obsolete. We should understand that responsibility as an unavoidable cost of enjoying freedom of speech, however, and keep in mind this cautionary tenet: What we ask the state to do for us, it risks doing to us.
